contracts require concerted or coordinated actions among the contracting individuals.
In coordinating actions , agents are involved in communication games whereby they convey the information required for the exchange. A symbolic and complex language then subserves the communication of information Modern linguistics as well has also adopted a view that leads to economics and even political theory and philosophy. I will start off by mentioning Ferdinand de Saussure. In his Course de Linguistique Générale of 1916, Saussure asserted that the linguistic signs, or Ala langue A , had originated in a social contract: A There is a language C
Sassure says
2 --only in virtue of a kind of social contract handed on among members of a community A Morover, the Swiss linguist was the first to establish that language was comprised of related signs that form a system. The saussurean sign is a one-toone mapping from meaning to sound that is lodged in the brains of at least two speakers. All individuals bound by language, Saussure 3 says ,reproduce the same sounds 4 mapped onto the same concepts. The origin of this social crystalization, Saussure goes on to explain , lies in the fact that the meaning-sound mapping is the same for all the individuals sharing a language because there is a coordination faculty that makes such coordination possible.
These words suggest that Bloomfield=s approach to the function of language calls to mind Smith=s speculation on language and division of labor. As economist Karl
Wärneryd remarked, there is no logical reason to expect that language is what makes possible the exchange 7 . For one thing division of labor --although not as in humans --occurs in animals without a complex language as in ants , wasps, bees and wolf packs 8 . Specialization in social insects is so surprinsing that Dawkins 9 asserts that these insects discovered -before man ! -that cultivation of food is more efficient than huntinggathering 10 . Therefore it is difficult to attribute the faculty of language as the main motivation that led to the division of labor 11 . The issue may be elucidated by looking into neandertal language. As there is no evidence that neandertals had a complex language as there is of early humans 15 , the hypothesis that the competitive edge could be realized by developing abstract symbols becomes compelling. The conclusion then that language and trade were originally in tandem seems unescapable . At this point it would seem logical to me that all cognitive capacities involved in trade ( such as the designing of tools for manufacturing exchangable goods, the exchange value of goods , and the ability to make decisions on goods ) should be observable in language. Now, the next step involves determining which came first, language or trade ?
Although no sharp response can be given, there is some logical priority to trade as opposed to language. Three arguments may be adduced. First, language is neither a necessary condition for the division of labor nor for trade .In the Shogren -Smith=s model, it is meat consumption and a previous division among members of the tribe ( skilled versus unskilled individuals) which triggered the division of labor. According to Shogren, the assumption that early humans were more skilled hunters than neandertals, allowed them to produce meat enough to exchange for goods produced by unskilled hunters.
Second, as language basically involves coordination problems, the same that trade and the division of labor do, it is plausible to assume that language depends on trade and the division of labor as well as on the more complex social relations added by trade. The ground for this dependency lies in the fact that the division of labor leads to coordination between ( at least ) two individuals thus incurring external coordination costs 16 . As a result, language could be a consequence of external coordination costs, A third argument is that some games can be played ( or preplayed) using communication, and in particular cheap talk , which does not add more or less value to payoffs.
So trade may occur without language, but language must be motivated., in the sense that a speaker S sends a message μ to a receiver R with a particular intentionality.
9-2 ,1956 ,181-189. Let=s look at these features to see precisely how they might be construed as games. The first conundrum that the saussurean sign poses is a coordination problem. In order to communicate, agents-speakers of a community must make the same associations between sound and meaning. Such coordination is solved by means of a coordination game 20 between meaning and sound . It must be noticed that Saussure ( Cours, Intro. III. ' 2 ) put forth that speakers in a population P must be endowed with A receptive and coordinating faculties A to attain the same one-to-one mapping.
Therefore meaning and sound must be coordinated in a communicating population P of senders / receivers because both meaning and sound are unattached to each other.
Meaning of sign S 1 could a priori be attached to any other string of sounds σ n and vice versa. This coordination problem can thus be formulated in the following way : how do sender and receiver of a message assign the same bidirectional mapping from meaning into sound and from sound into meaning ?
As all members of the population P want to use the same signs to communicate , all have a common interest and therefore must coordinate their choice. This is in essence a coordination game, in Schelling=s sense 21 . More specifically, he characterizes a coordination game according to the following three traits:
(1 ) Players= preferences are identical, so there is no conflict of interest ( 2 ) Each player=s best choice depends on the action he expects the other to take, which in turn depends on the other=s expectations of his own. In other words, the game is based upon the players= mutual expectations.
( 3 ) The players= goal is to share some common-interest activity by means of some cognitive process ( Schelling=s imagination, poetry and humor ). In the case of language, players want to use the same signs to communicate with each other.
Look at table 1. One player chooses a Row and other player chooses a Column. Row and Column represent tacit processes determining the payoffs. Since the players= goal is not to win, as in zero sum games, but rather to share some common interest by searching tacitly through cognitive processes, payoffs then only represent the degree of coordination attained by the players 22 . So the payoff matrix for a coordination game is different from zero sum games and non zero sum games. If players combine < R1 , C1
> they are better off than combining < R1, C2 > and better off than combining < R2 , C1 > and so on. As it is possible that whenever choosing one Row and chosing one Column 28 Otherwise said, the utility function of Sender u ( s ) and Receiver u ( a ) are equal. 29 As linguistic communication is a pure coordination, mass phenomenon ( individuals genetically unrelated), it is a real conundrum for a natural selection account of language origins and evolution, that ranges over either individuals or genes . This is skipped by S. Pinker, The Language Instinct, New York: HarperPerennial,1995 . strictly coordinating . Table 3 The UG hypothesis , however, has proved unable to present observable or empirical universals that account for overt and regular crosslinguistic variation 38 .
37 That is false in a strict (neo)darwinian view.
38 Universals of the kind required by supporters of the random generator view of universal grammar are located at the biological ( brain ) level of inquiry, skipping most of overt linguistic properties and offering no general account of crosslinguistic variation. At present such universals are missing, apart from the automaton.
A different way to tackle this regular variation, aka Greenberg universals, is to look at it as a coordination game problem in Schelling=s spirit. Language learning requires the input from the community where the learner grows up. All learners must converge on the input grammar, that is, they must coordinate their grammars with those of the input.
When coordination problems persist among members of a community, that community yields regular patterns to solving such problems, otherwise they adopt them from other communities (for example, by cultural difusion ). These regular patterns come to be common knowledge in the community 39 . Note also that in a coordination game an agent selects an action in an undetermined way within a bounded set. Thus we expect different conventions for different communities, using a bounded number of actions.
In fact, some computational models of language evolution suggest that overt empirical universals arise out of multiagents evolving across generations 40 .Linguistic generalizations ( aka rules of grammar ) spring out of cultural transmission, making innate Universal Grammar unnecessary.
